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What has happened down here is the winds have changed. 
Clouds roll in from the north and it started to rain. 
“It’s absolutely horrible,” says one of the women.  “Babies aren’t getting food.” 
“And they’re all black babies,” says the second woman. 
“Old people are dying in wheelchairs.  And they’re just leaving them to die,” says the first one. 
“People can’t get out of the city,” says the second. 
The scene is a metropolitan airport.  It is early September.  The nation is watching Katrina on 
television.  The two women are in their early twenties.  They are on break from their job at an 
airport coffee kiosk. 
A man, waiting for his plane, hears the conversation. 
“What are you guys going to do to make sure that never happens again?” he asks. 
“What do you mean?” says the first one. 
“What’s happening is horrible.  You’re right.  So what are you going to do about it?  What are 
you going to do to make sure Americans never have to go through anything like this again?” 
“What can we do?” shrugs the second one. 
The man says nothing. 
“Besides,” says the first one, “no one’s going to listen to anything people our age say.” 
The man mumbles something unintelligible and walks toward his gate. 
The woman is right.  What is she going to say?  “Y’all need to do a better job implementing 
the National Response Plan.”  Or, “We need more of those communities to be NIMS compliant.”  
And even if she does have something to say, to whom is she going to say it?  Whose job is it to 
fix the preparedness mess unmasked by Katrina? 
Rained real hard and it rained for a real long time. 
Six feet of water in the streets of Evangeline. 
There is one profession responsible for making sure Americans are not systematically 
ignored the next time catastrophe strikes: public administrators.  It is ultimately their job to 
prevent terrorism, respond to disaster, and lead the tedious and often thankless task of recovering 
from catastrophe. 
All the talk over the past four years about the perniciousness of “stovepipes” obscures the 
foundation that connects those pipes: public service.1
Public administrators, at least in theory, are responsible for conducting the public’s business, 
acting in the public’s interest, and conscientiously balancing formal requirements with the 
wisdom to do the right thing. 
That is theory.  The reality of public administration is considerably less Panglossian. 
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State, local and the national governments performed incompetently preparing for Katrina and 
responding to Katrina.2 Strategies were ignored.  Plans were not executed.  Resources were 
wasted.  We spent four years preparing for the unthinkable.  The thinkable happened and we 
were not ready. 
The entire preparedness system – staffed essentially by public administrators – failed to 
perform government’s primary job: to secure the unalienable right to life.  With a few notable 
exceptions,3 individuals and agencies were unable to bring together the knowledge, skills, 
abilities, or resources to do what the unraveling situation required. How could this incompetence 
be?  How could this incompetence have happened? 
Katrina provides an opportunity to think about what historically has been the normative 
bedrock of public service: competence. 
The river rose all day. 
The river rose all night. 
The history of public administration in the United States is a story of the changing 
relationships between public servants and their polity.  The Founding Fathers paid some attention 
to the administrative problems associated with running a nation, but during the initial century of 
the American empire, there was a general aversion to the idea of a permanent group of civil 
servants.   
In 1887, Woodrow Wilson – then a professor at Bryn Mawr College – made the first serious 
claim that administering the public’s business should be a professional discipline.  Wilson wrote 
that the discipline’s central focus should be effectiveness and efficiency.  
It is the object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can 
properly and successfully do, and secondly, how it can do these proper things 
with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money 
or of energy.4
Wilson’s effort to bring competence into public work was motivated by a desire to remedy 
what he termed “a civil service which was rotten full fifty years ago.”5 In words that read like 
they were prepared for testimony to the U.S. House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, 
Wilson wrote (in 1887): 
The poisonous atmosphere of city government, the crooked secrets of state 
administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and again 
discovered in the bureaux at Washington forbid us to believe that any clear 
conceptions of what constitutes good administration are as yet very widely 
current in the United States.6
The corruption and incompetence in the public sector of the 19th and early 20th 
century contributed to the growth of the progressive movement.7 In time, that led to civil 
service reform and to the demand, in Robert Biller’s phrase, “that the public’s business be 
conducted with competence, efficiency and care.”8
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Some people got lost in the flood. 
Some people got away alright. 
In the first few decades of the 1900s, the “public’s business” remained an 
inconsequential part of the America enterprise.  The nation was under the normative sway 
of the “rugged individualist” and the economic direction of corporate interests.  Herbert 
Hoover spoke of government as an umpire, not a player in economic life.  He believed 
that government involvement in the private sector would threaten democracy and 
individual freedom.9
By 1932, twenty five percent of the U.S. workforce did not have a job.  The Great 
Depression drained the ruggedness from the individualist mythos and forced a 
reconsideration of government’s role in American life.  Franklin Roosevelt’s election 
accelerated an expansion of government that lasted for fifty years.10 For people who 
grew up during the Great Depression, getting a government job, with its reliable 
paycheck and steady tenure, was a good career move.  
From the 1900s until the late 1940s, public administration’s competence framework 
was constructed by practitioners who were guided by what Wilson called “stable 
principle.”  People learned to do their work as apprentices.  Elders who relied on 
experienced-based principles – what in today’s homeland security world might be called 
“doctrine” – tutored the new workers.  In many respects, public administration was a 
guild. 
The river has busted through clear down to Plaquemines. 
Six feet of water in the streets of Evangeline. 
In 1946, Herbert Simon challenged the prevailing competence frame by arguing that a 
true science of administration could not be built on those stable principles, or what he 
called “proverbs.”  Administration had to be based on the products of operational 
definitions of concepts and empirical theory – i.e., normal science.11 Simon and other 
intellectual leaders transformed public administration from a domain where competent 
practitioners were guided by heuristics, to a realm where competence was defined by an 
“administrative science” that provided objective guidance about the right things to do and 
the right ways to do them.  Government service became another – although somewhat 
second-class – home for the archetypical Organization Man.12 
The socially chaotic 1960s and the early 1970s brought renewed attention to the role 
government could play in improving people’s lives.  The normative premise of what 
came to be called the New Public Administration was captured by Todd LaPorte’s vision 
that “the purpose of public organization is the reduction of economic, social and psychic 
suffering, and the enhancement of life opportunities for those inside and outside the 
organization.”13 
Public service attracted people who wanted to end economic and social inequality, 
both in the United States and in other countries.  Competence was defined largely by 
having good intentions and the skills to turn those intentions into programs that improved 
people’s lives.  
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society marked the twilight years of public administration as 
an activity to enhance “life opportunities” for Americans.  People started getting elected 
by arguing that government was the problem.  Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, 
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Bush, and Clinton sought to end – at least semantically – the “era of big government.”14 
From the time Johnson decided not to run for a second term through the 2001 terror 
attacks, government programs and rules became anathema to the economy, the good life, 
and individual liberty.15 
The waxing distrust of government, and the growing economic opportunities in the 
private sector contributed to the considerable decline in the desirability of government 
jobs.16 In the 1980s and 1990s, public service was frequently perceived as an 
organizational sanctuary for the unambitious, for people who could not succeed in the 
competitive, entrepreneurial, and unforgiving world of the private sector.  It was a place 
for drones.17 
President Coolidge came down in a railroad train, 
With a little fat man with a note-pad in his hand. 
Woodrow Wilson’s 118-year-old dictum that “the field of administration is a field of 
business” is today’s dogma.  The private sector – even in the face of Enron, WorldCom, 
Tyco, ImClone, Adelphia, Global Crossing and other examples of incompetence and 
corruption – remains the primary normative framework for public sector administrative 
aspirations.  The language of business has suffused the public sector in ways too 
numerous to recount.  Agencies have business plans and supply chains; they use 
benchmarks to identify best practices and industry standards.  Public administrators are 
public managers.  Citizens morphed into clients and customers.  The DHS Secretary talks 
about his desire to “re-engineer” preparedness and “re-tool” FEMA.18 
The comparatively few remaining administrators who entered government in the 
1970s will be leaving public service within the next few years.  Fifty percent of federal 
workers are eligible to retire in the next four years.  Three quarters of those people are 
senior executives.19 These administrators depart with their substantive and tacit 
knowledge, and with memories of a time when government and business operations were 
not synonymous.  
Government service continues to be uninviting.  As a February 2005 report from the 
Partnership for Public Services described the dilemma, “Many Americans view 
government careers as uninteresting or unappealing, or believe the federal workplace is in 
need of reform, making it difficult to attract and retain talent.”20 Have you ever heard a 
child say, “When I grow up, I want to be a public administrator?”21 
The president say, ''Little fat man isn't it a shame 
What the river has done to this poor cracker’s land." 
Public administrators have taken a beating for over thirty years.  What once was a 
domain of service is a fallow of despair.22 Homeland security – with its myriad agencies 
defiled by the mediocrity of its Katrina response – symbolizes the status of much of the 
public sector. 
A 2005 survey of people who work for the national government found “only 12 
percent of the more than 10,000 DHS employees who returned a government 
questionnaire said they felt strongly that they were ‘encouraged to come up with new and 
better ways of doing things’.”23 It is difficult for imagination or initiative to flourish in 
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an organization where only 3 percent of the workers are confident personnel decisions are 
"based on merit," only 18 percent feel strongly that they are "held accountable for 
achieving results," and only 4 percent are certain "creativity and innovation are 
rewarded."24 
One could argue – based on the Katrina, Rita and Wilma headlines about response – 
that public sector incompetence is chiefly the result of unqualified leaders.  But that 
explanation is too narrow.  Followers are as critical to the competence equation as the 
men and women who carry the title of leader.25 Incompetence is the result of government 
workers who accept less than an impassioned best from elected officials, appointed 
leaders, co-workers, and themselves.  Incompetence is the result of a governance 
philosophy that belittles governance. 
So what to do? 
Mechanistically-minded reformers have already noted a need for structural and 
functional corrections to our preparedness system.  DHS will be re-organized on the basis 
of its Second Stage Review – an analysis conducted before the Hurricanes.  There are 
calls for competency-based hiring and for more concerted effort to promote people based 
on merit.26 
The mechanical prescription to “find the problem and fix it” may be too powerful to 
allow consideration of an alternative strategy.27 The machine metaphor has guided a 
century of reform efforts. 
The public sector has been organizing, reorganizing, searching for excellence, 
downsizing, reinventing itself, outsourcing, and hiring competence for years.28 The 
Katrina cataclysm offers yet another opportunity for what one government executive 
called the “Troika of Doom” to move into action: think tanks will sell ideas about 
improving preparedness to substantively inexperienced political leaders, who then award 
contracts to favored Washington Beltway companies.29 What comes out of this largely 
unexamined churn will be more paper producing, acronym generating, PowerPoint 
numbing programs for “improving” the nation’s preparedness.   
There is another approach to reinvigorating public sector competence and 
preparedness.  It looks first to the spirit of public service rather than the sterility of 
standards. 
Louisiana, Louisiana. 
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
Americans disagree about the rightness of involving American troops in the 
Terrorism Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.  But practically every American 
“supports our troops.”  There is an admiration, compassion and appreciation for what 
these warriors have volunteered to do.  The military’s warrior ethos does not come solely 
or even most directly from standards-based training.  It comes from an inner belief – 
reinforced by their leaders and by each other – that what they are doing is right for their 
nation.30 
To be effective, the ethos of public sector has to come from a similar source.  It 
cannot be mandated by law, “incentivized” by bonuses, or built in to a program.  The 
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competence of the public administrator is more organic than mechanical.  It has to be 
grown and nourished.   
For the next catastrophe – whether hurricane, terrorist attack, or pandemic – 
Americans are told to be ready to take care of themselves for 72 hours to several weeks 
before the cavalry arrives.  Self-reliance is good counsel for the public sector as well.  
The responsibility for returning competence to the core of public work rests with 
individual administrators.   
Steven Covey writes about the “circle of influence and the circle of concern.”31 
Public workers have been slimed by the abysmal Katrina response.  Those who care 
about that should be concerned about competence in the public sector.  But each person 
has a different circle of influence; a different way to contribute to eliminating what 
Woodrow Wilson called “the poisonous atmosphere…, the crooked secrets…, the 
confusion, sinecurism, and corruption.”
For a few emergency managers with many years’ experience it might mean a 
willingness to disrupt their lives and finances to rebuild a federal system that died from 
neglect.  For someone just starting government service, it could be no longer tolerating 
the co-worker who spends hours everyday checking email and surfing websites.  For 
another person, it could be taking the responsibility to eliminate unproductive meetings.  
It could be refusing to notionalize the difficult parts of a preparedness exercise, and 
instead insisting that participants “exercise in the red zone.”  It could be creating new 
ways to work effectively with other agencies, contractors, and the private sector.   
Louisiana, Louisiana. 
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
A dominant metaphor characterizes each era of public administration’s evolution as a 
discipline.  At first, administrators were artisans, skilled at the public’s business.  Next, 
the competent ones aspired to become scientists, guided by the truth of empirical reality.  
In the 1960s and 70s, administrators struggled to enact the metaphor of social reformer, 
looking to improve life.  The present era depicts public administrators as managers.   
All metaphors eventually lose their power.  Katrina convincingly demonstrated the 
sedentary emptiness of the “public administrator as manager” metaphor.  But it is not 
clear what will replace it.   
For a brief time, Katrina had the potential to transform the nation’s expectations about 
government and the public sector.  That time may be gone.  In less than four months, the 
attention of unaffected publics has moved on to other matters.32 Organizational curtains 
have veiled the dispirited chaos of the preparedness world.  The public sector risks 
descending further into denial.   
Ten years before Wilson wrote his generative public administration essay, Japan’s 
Tokugawa period came to an end and with it that nation’s feudal society.  The social 
turmoil brought forth ronin, samurai who no longer had a master.  Ronin were forced by 
their circumstances to think freely, to develop structural independence, and to lead the 
way to Japan’s new social system.33 
Public administrators who care about their calling are in an analogous state.  Like 
ronin, they too work in a realm that has lost its masters and principled center.  Individual 
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administrators have an opportunity to develop a new ethos of competence by breaking the 
tradition of psychic feudalism that is the public sector.  It requires acting from personal 
courage instead of personal fear.  It requires personal adaptability, autonomy and an 
insistent excellence. 34 It requires – in Gandhi’s phrase – being the change you want to 
see.  
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
They're tryin' to wash us away.35 
The unthinkable is still out there: detonation of a nuclear device, biological attacks, 
terrorist assaults on schools.  Thinkable catastrophes are also visible: a major earthquake 
in San Francisco, a chemical plant explosion in New Jersey, and Avian flu everywhere.  
The public sector has a second chance to get better prepared. 
Spirit does not return easily.  It will take years to return the ethos of competence.  It is 
not obvious that we have that much time.  But no one is going to bring competence back 
except the people who care about the service part of public service.
In 1776, Thomas Jefferson wrote: 
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should 
not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all 
experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while 
evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to 
which they are accustomed. 
Jefferson and the fifty-five other men who signed the Declaration of Independence 
asserted that whenever any form of government fails to accomplish its basic purposes, 
…it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its 
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness. 
What happened after Katrina struck was the insufferable sadness of systemic 
incompetence.  The American people deserve a government and a public service that 
does not allow that to happen again. 
 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report (New York: Barnes & Noble 
Publishing, Inc., 2004), 403, 418. 
 
7Bellavita: An Opportunity for Competence
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
2 For some examples, see  U.S. Congress House Committee on Government Reform,  A First Look at Lessons Learned from 
Katrina, September 15, 2005; Bob Herbert, "A Failure of Leadership," New York Times, September 5, 2005; Susan B. Glasser 
and Josh White, “Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top,” Washington Post, September 4, 2005, A1; Tim Naftali, "Department of 
Homeland Screw-Up," Slate, September 6, 2005.; “Miscommunication Cited In Katrina Response,” Associated Press, 
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Katrina-Military.html (accessed October 12, 2005); Donald F. Kettl, “The Worst 
Is Yet to Come: Lessons from September 11 and Hurricane Katrina,” Fels Government Research Service Report 05-01 
(September 2005); and Pew Research Center, “Two-In-Three Critical Of Bush's Relief Efforts. Huge Racial Divide Over Katrina 
and Its Consequences,” September 8, 2005.  The accusations of incompetence continued beyond September 2005: "FEMA still 
does not know any more about what it was doing last week than it was a month ago," Representative David R. Obey of 
Wisconsin, the ranking Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, said. "It is still, as far as I am concerned, an 
incompetent agency;" quoted in Eric Lipton, “Number Overstated for Storm Evacuees in Hotels,” New York Times, October 19, 
2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/19/national/nationalspecial/19housing.html (accessed October 20, 2005). 
3 Initial exceptions include the United States Coast Guard and several responder agencies in Alabama and Mississippi.  As 
response and recovery activities stabilized, individual and agency performance improved.  
4 Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly 2, no. 1 (June 1887), in Jay Shafritz and 
Albert C. Hyde, Classics of Public Administration (Wadsworth Publishing, 1978), 3.   
5 Ibid., 8. 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 Waldo, Dwight, The Administrative State, 2nd ed. (Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1983), Chapter 1; Richard Hofstadter, Age 
Of Reform (Knopf, 1955).  The Pendleton Act, adopted in 1883, was the first significant national reform of civil service. Ari 
Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History Of The Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (University of Illinois Press, 
2000). 
8 Robert Biller, “Some Implications of Adaptation Capacity for Organizational and Political Development,” in Frank Marini 
(ed.), Toward A New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective (Scranton: Chandler Pub. Co, 1971), 94  
9 Contrast Hoover’s views with those attributed to Mike Brown, former FEMA director, in 2001: “The general idea -- that 
the business of government is not to provide services, but to make sure that they are provided -- seems self-evident to me."  (Jon 
Elliston, "Disaster in the making," Independent Weekly, September 22, 2004, http://www.indyweek.com/durham/2004-09-
22/cover.html; cited by Charles Perrow, in “Using Organizations: the Case of FEMA,” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 2, (Fall 
2005). 
10 See, for example, the four volume work by Arthur M Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt (Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1959). It has been suggested that Roosevelt only continued the trend of expanding the size of government that began before the 
Progressive era.  See Randall G. Holcombe, “Federal Government Growth Before the New Deal,” September 1, 1997 
http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=360 (accessed October 25, 2006). 
11 Herbert Simon, “The Proverbs of Administration,” originally published in 1947, reprinted in Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. 
Hyde, eds., Classics of Public Administration, 4th ed. (Harcourt Brace, 1997), 127-41.  Simon’s concerns are echoed in 
contemporary calls for homeland security metrics. 
12 William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (Doubleday, 1956). 
13 Todd La Porte, “The Recovery of Relevance in the Study of Public Orgaization,” in Frank Marini, (ed.), Toward A New 
Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective (Chandler Pub. Co, 1971), 32. 
14 George W. Bush, as David Brooks argues, has not been part of this legacy – either forced by circumstances or directed by 
philosophy.  Brooks quotes Bush that "Government should help people improve their lives, not run their lives,” and observes that 
"This is not the Government-Is-the-Problem philosophy of the mid-'90s, but the philosophy of a governing majority party in a 
country where people look to government to play a positive but not overbearing role in their lives.” David Brooks, “The Savior of 
the Right,” New York Times, October 23, 2005 
(http://select.nytimes.com/2005/10/23/opinion/23brooks.html?n=Top%2fOpinion%2fEditorials%20and%20Op%2dEd%2fOp%2
dEd%2fColumnists%2fDavid%20Brooks) (Accessed October 29, 2005.) 
15 For examples, see The Pew Research Center, “How Americans View Government: Deconstructing Distrust,” March 10, 
1998.  Available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=95 (Accessed October 29, 2005). 
16 Gregory B. Lewis & Sue A. Frank, Public Administration Review 62, Issue 4 (July/August 2002), 395. 
17 See “Attitude About Public Service” data in The Pew Research Center, “How Americans View Government: 
Deconstructing Distrust,” March 10, 1998, op.cit. 
8 Homeland Security Affairs Vol.  [2005], No. 2, Article 5
http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/volI/iss2/art5
18 Spencer S. Hsu, “Chertoff Vows to 'Re-Engineer' Preparedness,” Washington Post, October 20, 2005, A2.  Spence S. Hsu, 
“After the Storm, Chertoff Vows to Reshape DHS.  Secretary Pledges to Learn From Mistakes of Katrina,” Washington Post,
November 14, 2005, A11. 
19 David M. Walker, “Managing Human Capital in the 21st Century,” (Government Accountability Office), March 9, 2000; 
and Leonard Wiener, “Brain Drain: Half Of All Federal Workers Can Retire In Five Years,” U.S. News and World Report,
November 22, 2004.   
20Partnership for Public Service and National Academy of Public Administration, “Where the Jobs Are. The Continuing 
Growth of Federal Job Opportunities,” February 2005.  Available at 
http://www.ourpublicservice.org/publications3735/publications_show.htm?doc_id=260717&page=1
21 The 1998 PEW poll (op. cit.) found little change in numbers of people recommending government service to a child, in a 
hypothetical.  More than half said no.  The impact of Katrina on perceptions of government is evident in a September 22, 2005 
Pew Research Center survey.  More than half the adults polled agreed with the statement “Government is almost always wasteful 
and inefficient.”  That represents an increase from 47% in December 2004 to 56% in September 2005. 
22 United States Office of Personnel Management, “What Do Federal Employees Say? Results from the 2004 Federal 
Human Capital Survey,” (no date), available at http://www.fhcs2004.opm.gov/Published.htm (accessed October 28, 2005). 
23 David E. Rosenbaum, “Study Ranks Homeland Security Department Lowest in Morale,” New York Times, October 16, 
2005.  The story also noted “… in answer to the question "How would you rate the overall quality of work done by your 
workgroup?" only 22 percent of Homeland Security employees answered "very good."  Only 20 percent strongly agreed that "My 
work gives me a sense of personal accomplishment."  Only 27 percent strongly agreed that "people I work with cooperate to get 
their job done," and 13 percent strongly agreed that "my job makes good use of my skills and abilities."  In each of these 
instances, the department's employees were less positive about their jobs than were workers at any other department or agency in 
the study.” 
24 Quotes from http://www.stephensonstrategies.com/2005/10/24.html; see United States Office of Personnel Management 
Agency (op. cit.), Parts 1 through 5 for specific survey results. 
25 John W. Gardner, On Leadership (Free Press, 1993), 1, 2, 48. 
26 Michael Chertoff, “Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff before the United States House Select 
Committee on Hurricane Katrina,” October 19, 2005.  Available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4896
(accessed November 1, 2005). 
27 For a homeland security-related discussion of how the uncritical application of the machine metaphor can affect policy 
deliberations, see Richard A. Posner, “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent,” New York Times, August 29, 2004. 
28 For examples, see David M. Walker, “Managing Human Capital in the 21st Century,” (op. cit.)  
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/ and http://www.opm.gov/employ/html/COMPTNCY.HTM
29 Comment made by a Department of Homeland Security manager in an off-the-record meeting, September 5, 2005.   
30 Dexter Filkins, “The Fall of the Warrior King,” New York Times, October 23, 2005; and Dave Grossman, On Killing 
(Back Bay Books, 1996), 291-292.  This idea is also captured in a quote from General George C. Marshall: "The soldier is a man; 
he expects to be treated as an adult, not a schoolboy. He has rights; they must be made known to him and thereafter respected. He 
has ambition; it must be stirred. He has a belief in fair play; it must be honored. He has a need of comradeship; it must be 
supplied. He has imagination; it must be stimulated. He has a sense of personal dignity; it must be sustained. He has pride; it can 
be satisfied and made the bedrock of character once he has been assured that he is playing a useful and respected role. To give a 
man this is the acme of inspired leadership. He has become loyal because loyalty was given to him." 
31 Stephen R. Covey, The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People (Free Press, 1990), 81. 
32 “Forgotten already,” (New Orleans) Times-Picayune, November 13, 2005; Cathy Booth Thomas, “New Orleans Today: 
It's Worse Than You Think,” Time, November 20, 2005. 
33 Beverly Potter, The Way of the Ronin: Riding the Waves Of Change (Ronin Publishing, 2001), 61. 
9Bellavita: An Opportunity for Competence
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
34 Ibid., p. 68 and 69.  See also David Brown, “When Disaster Strikes, You Need To Take Matters Into Your Own Hands,” 
Seattle Times, October 9, 2005.  During the Katrina response, there were numerous examples of individuals and groups who 
violated rules clearly inappropriate for the situation.  In one example, helicopter pilots disobeyed their orders in order to save 
more stranded people.  There were also instances where rules were inappropriately obeyed.  For example, some volunteer police 
officers were not allowed to help with the response until they completed a sexual harassment course.  There are times when 
disrupting convention or breaking rules is the right thing to do, and times when it clearly is wrong.  People who pick incorrectly 
face consequences.  A more complete discussion of when to obey rules and when to disobey them  – and the consequences of 
following a ronin path – goes beyond the scope of this article.   
35 Louisiana 1927, by Randy Newman, The Boston Globe, September 7, 2005.  
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/09/07/louisiana_1927/ (accessed October 29, 2005). 
“The lyrics … tell the story of the Louisiana flood of 1927, which killed hundreds and displaced hundreds of thousands across six 
states. The disaster is credited with sparking one of the great voting movements of the 20th century -- the shift in Southern black 
allegiance from the Republican to the Democratic Party -- and with spurring the New Deal politics of big government.”  See also 
John. M. Brody, “The Prologue, and Maybe the Coda,” New York Times, September 4, 2005.  Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover was in charge of the 1927 flood rescue activities.  His successful efforts helped him get elected to the Presidency in 1928.  
10 Homeland Security Affairs Vol.  [2005], No. 2, Article 5
http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/volI/iss2/art5
